

## INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SEPARATION CENTRES

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### ISSUES PAPER

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1. Are there additional risks of harm arising from the concentration of offenders in a single unit, such as:
  - a. Physical attack,
  - b. Mutual reinforcement of or increase in terrorist views,
  - c. Damage to the regime of the SC system through collective non-cooperation?
2. Are there additional risks of harm associated with the type of prisoner likely to be held in an SC, e.g. one subject to a long or indeterminate sentence with nothing to lose; or one who may seek to continue a terrorism career within prison?
3. Are these risks being properly accounted for when considering whether to put an individual in an SC; and when considering the right mix of prisoners in an SC?
4. Is there any acceptable level of risk of the harm types at 1a-c above?
5. What are the human consequences of reducing the level of risk to near zero for individuals who are in, or who might otherwise be placed in, an SC through for example:
  - a. Greater use of segregation cells within an SC, or elsewhere in the estate,
  - b. Greater use of Close Supervision Centres,
  - c. Creation of a bespoke regime such as found at ADX Florence, Colorado?
6. Is the nature and degree of harm caused by a physical attack in an SC greater than that caused by an attack in the general estate:
  - a. Because an attack in an SC is more likely to be terrorism,
  - b. Because an attack by a prisoner in an SC is liable to have a radicalising effect within the SC and, assuming news spreads, the wider estate,
  - c. Because such an attack has a greater impact on staff than other attacks,
  - d. Because such an attack frustrates legitimate expectations by victims and wider society that a terrorist should never be able to use violence again?
7. How can the risk be avoided of drawing false conclusions from a rare attack within an SC, e.g. by overemphasizing factors associated with this attack/ attacker, and potentially missing other factors?
8. Is change to the SC system needed, or merely improved operation (e.g. better risk assessment, resources, staff training, access to intelligence)?

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